The real line in the sand

However much we wish to empower the Libyan rebels, Iraq and Afghanistan teach us that UN legitimacy has to be the watchword, says Sir Menzies Campbell.

The leaders of those countries which have come together to prevent Muammar Gaddafi inflicting a terrible revenge on those who dared challenge his authority are under pressure to react quickly and decisively in a very fast-moving situation. But as they do so the lessons of Srebrenica, Iraq and Afghanistan hang around them like chains.

The willingness to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, the recognition of the necessity of UN legitimacy, and the determination to establish and maintain consensus among a broad coalition, particularly in the region, are all indicative of world leaders who are mindful of the lessons of the recent past.

In the differing interpretations of UN Security Resolutions 1970 and 1973, we see the risk of attempting to bend legality to strategic and military objectives.

There is real doubt whether actions taken to protect Libyan civilians under the UN mandate provided by these resolutions extend to providing arms to the insurgents. The embargo on the supply of arms included in Resolution 1973 arguably extends to both sides in Libya.

Those such as the American defence secretary Robert Gates will be mindful of the arming of the Afghan mujahidin in the 1980s. His caution towards arming the Libyan insurgents is understandable, given reports that elements of Hezbollah and al-Qaeda have been detected amongst the rebels.

William Hague has rightly said that questions of advisability are different from questions of legality. In providing arms to the insurgents we cannot be sure who we would be arming and to what use they will put these arms.

Substantial differences exist among those nations represented at the London conference last week but strength of purpose has so far kept them together. All effort should be made not to jeopardise this unity by unthinking provision of arms.

There is the risk of erosion of support among an already doubtful public. Intervention can be ineffective, slow and selective but when it has lawful authority, is born out of the desire to protect civilian life and is restricted to legitimised military methods, it is justifiable.

The ‘duty to protect’, outlined by Security Resolution 1973, is both the legal and moral basis for intervention in Libya. The resolution calls for an immediate ceasefire and allows for “all available measures” to protect civilians, expressly authorising the use of weapons. This could entail shooting down aircraft, bombing tanks and supply columns and attacking troops on the ground.

It was Gaddafi’s conduct towards the Libyan demonstrators and his threats to the insurgents – which were credible given his history – which prompted the West, with the support of the Arab League and the Gulf Co-operation Council, to act. We cannot protect every democratic aspirant in the world, but where we can we should. Where circumstances permit, we can do a great deal.

The unmistakable truth is that we can do more for stability and the protection of life when our actions are legitimised by UN mandate and are implemented by a coalition of nations.

The lessons learned from the run-up to the Iraq war were instrumental in ensuring consensus was secured before we intervened in Libya.We should ensure that in years to come the merit of our actions in Libya is not overshadowed by criticism that the legitimacy of that act was lost.

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