Question: Following the Iraq war would you say we are now in uncharted territory in terms of foreign policy?

Malcolm Rifkind: Well, it's not just the post-Iraq conflict, it is really post-9/11, which has been the main traumatic development that has affected the whole world and the United States in particular.

And the effect of 9/11 was that questions over security, questions over terrorism, the whole Middle East controversy became a matter not just of importance to the foreign policy experts but became a domestic political issue within the United States, which has led to a much more robust US foreign policy.

Question: Does the new "strike before it's too late" approach used by the US and UK in Iraq mean that we can now expect to see further and greater intervention in failing and rogue states?

Malcolm Rifkind: Not necessarily, because of course the main consequence of the war in Iraq in terms of the doctrine of pre-emption is that the weapons of mass destruction have not been discovered. That is bound to have a powerful effect on public opinion both in the United States and elsewhere.

The doctrine of pre-emption is not in itself unreasonable, if you know you are going to be attacked you don't wait until you are attacked until to respond.

But for that doctrine to be persuasive, two things have to exist.

First of all, you have to recognise that it can't just be a right for the United States or the United Kingdom, it would have to be a right for every country in the world, and that creates a pretty unstable situation.

Secondly, if you're going to attack a country that's not yet attacked you, you have to at least be able to disclose the evidence on which your fears were based, either before the attack or subsequently.

And in the case of Iraq, the argument used was the weapons of mass destruction, they have not yet been discovered, and therefore that must be a powerful impact on further consideration of such an attack.

Question: If the doctrine is to be credible - and not just an excuse dreampt up to justify the war with Iraq - surely we should now be addressing other rogue states and drawing up some kind of hitlist?

Malcolm Rifkind: Well, no because the doctrine of pre-emption as far as I understand it is based on whether the country that is contemplating an attack believes itself to be under severe and immediate threat.

Now with the so-called rogue states, there are genuine and fundamental concerns, but I don't believe that the United States considers that Iran is about to attack the United States or North Korea or Syria or Libya.

The problems are fundamental, but they are of a different order and have to be resolved in a different way.

Question: That doctrine, and subsequent events, have sent out the message that the US could become the world's policeman at the expense of the UN. Do you think that is something there is a risk of?

Malcolm Rifkind: To have an effective international security, you need both an international legitimacy for any action you take, but you also need to have effective military power.

When it comes to the latter, the United States is the only country in the world which has the kind of clout, the kind of ability to deploy its forces overseas that can make a fundamental difference, and therefore to exclude and not involve the United States in these matters would be naïve and unrealistic.

It is desirable also to have some form of internationally sanctioned legitimacy for the action you take, which is why the ideal situation is to have the United Nations security council supporting action, and the United States, and perhaps the United Kingdom or France, being the way in which the policy is delivered.

If you cannot combine the legitimacy and military power, then you have a problem, as we saw in the case in Iraq.

Question: Should the US now be stepping back and allowing the UN, at least in public, to take up the position in the drivng seat?

Malcolm Rifkind: Well, you can't be in the driving seat unless you actually have the car and the UN doesn't have the car, it doesn't have any troops of its own, it relies on other countries to provide troops. And if you're talking about Iraq, the only country that matters in terms of power is the United States.

What the US has recognised, or seems to be recognising, is that it has a need for some more substantial deployment of troops to help them maintian security.

These will not be forthcoming from other countries unless some sort of international mandate is approved, so I think what we might end up with is a new United Nations resolution, where the United Nations invites the United States to act on its behalf rather than acting unilaterally as at present.

Question: Prior to the war we were told the removal of Saddam Hussein would be essential to stabilise the wider Middle East. Since then tensions and attacks are growing by the day. What is the future for the road map at this current moment in time?

Malcolm Rifkind: Well, I think that there is no better show in town. It's hugely difficult to see immediate substantial progress but take away the road map and you have a complete vacuum and you have a complete return to mindless violence on both sides.

So the road map offers a framework, which would both remove the violence and also offer an opportunity for constitutional progress.

Of course it's going to be slow, and if the will doesn't exist on either or both sides to make it work then it won't work.

But there isn't an alternative available and the big achievement it represents is involving the United States, which was not present for the first period of the Bush administration.

Question: The Hutton inquiry has pushed the work of the intelligence services into the public domain in quite an unprecedented way. As a former former foreign secretary are you worried that this is leading to a politicisation of the intelligence services?

Malcolm Rifkind: Not so much politicisation in terms of party political, but I don't believe the role of intelligence agencies is to be made an arm of government in trying to convince the public or parliament.

The intelligence agencies are there to provide information to the government, not to be used to give a character reference to the government.

Question: Has the credibility of the service been undermined by the 45-minute claim?

Malcolm Rifkind: Well of course it has, because what the intelligence agencies do is provide very good access to raw material, and they turn that raw material into editorial digest for ministers to assist them when they have their mind on policy matters.

Once you start having their conclusions replicated in public documents without the necessary health warnings about the various caveats that would normally exist, then they become articles of propaganda rather than articles of information. And that must be damaging.

Question: Is it right that intelligence material can be hauled into the public domain to justify the political decision to intervene in a third-party state?

Malcolm Rifkind: The information that's out there might sometimes be worth putting into the public domain, but it should never be referred to as intelligence information.

The point that I'm concerned about is not the information itself.

If the government wanted to argue the 45-minute claim, for example, then it should have done so without referring to its sources.

Now that's difficult, I acknowledge that, but the consequence is what we now see, which is damage to the intelligence agencies and a lack of credibility.

Question: British Conservative politicians are actively involved in calling for "no" votes in Eastern European referendums. How do you feel about that?

Malcolm Rifkind: When you say "actively involved", I'm not exactly sure what you mean. If individuals wish to act as individuals, that's their responsibility which they've got to answer for.

No political party in Britain that I'm aware of is active, and I think that foreigners that involve themselves in local referendums it is unlikely that they might have much of an impact.

Question: You didn't make the shortlist for the Windsor seat. How did you feel about that?

Malcolm Rifkind: Oh, I'm very philosophical about that. Politics is a funny business, and perhaps is a funny business in Windsor as well.

Question: Would you say you are going to dust yourself and move on?

Malcolm Rifkind: That's your phrase not mine. But I'm very philosophical about it, it's the nature of politics.

Question: Are you not concerned that the impression it gives it that you've had your time in the sun?

Malcolm Rifkind: Well, that's for other people to judge. The sun comes in, the sun comes out and the sun goes back in again. And this summer is a rather good time to be talking about that.

Question: Do you have any regrets about not seeking a seat outside Scotland after the 1997 defeat?

Malcolm Rifkind: Not in the slightest. When you lose a constituency, you like to win it back and I can't do that again because the boundary commission are abolishing the seat.

Question: The impression one gets speaking to some senior Tories is that they are bullish about their electoral prospects. Yet at an abysmal time for the government Labour is consistently out-polling your party. Even Michael Foot had a lead of Margaret Thatcher - is there cause for concern here?

Malcolm Rifkind: No I don't think there is. What we've always discovered is that opinion polls underestimate our strength, we saw that in the local elections, we saw that in the last European elections. In both cases we actually overtook the Labour Party and had healthy victories, so there's no reason to believe that can't happen again.

Question: You are still viewed as one of the party's "big beasts" but there are several others still in the Commons - Ken Clarke, Maude and Portillo. Isn't it time that they became more pro-active and, in a sense, come to the aid of the party?

Malcolm Rifkind: I think they are very proactive, and I think they are involved.

But each person's got to make up their own mind how they can best do that, how they can best make that contribution, and I have no reason to doubt that is what they're doing.