Andrew Murrison

Question: What was your reaction to Colin Powell's report to the UN?

Andrew Murrison: Clearly there were no smoking guns. I think a lot of people were disappointed because certainly it had been hyped up somewhat. We were perhaps expecting rather more than what was forthcoming.

I remain of the opinion that Britain and America need to convince the United Nations of the merits of an escalation in hostilities and we need to obtain a second UN resolution. I also think the matter needs to be thoroughly debated in the House of Commons before UK forces are committed in the way that we appear to be building up to do.

Question: Do you think the troops can be brought back without a war and what happens if Hans Blix asks to be given more time?

Andrew Murrison: In terms of Hans Blix, we'll have to wait and see what he says. I think he's coming out of this extremely well he's coming across as a thoroughly expert person; someone who is capable of forming a very balanced judgement on what's going on in Iraq. I think he is the lynchpin to all of this.

From the comments of the French, though I wouldn't necessarily endorse their position, there was a clear signal that we need to escalate the activities of the inspectors and that means more resources. We need to increase the number of over flights and generally make it difficult for Iraq to deploy the weapons of mass destruction that the governments here and in America consider that Saddam has.

Is it possible to withdraw troops at this late stage? The truth is of course it is. The difficulty is that there is a window of opportunity because of the climate in the Middle East and we are rapidly approaching the end of that window. Strategically it becomes quite a difficult issue and I can quite see why America would want to act quickly.

If it doesn't act very soon then it has to delay things until later on in the year. I can see the strategic imperative that America has but at the end of the day this has been going on for some considerable time. Unless the is evidence of a clear and imminent danger of Iraq deploying its weapons of mass destruction or stronger links are demonstrated with organisations of the sort that are likely to cause a repetition of September 11 then I think we have to take a longer view. That's my personal opinion.

Question: Should there be a Commons debate and a vote?

Andrew Murrison: Clearly were we to do that then there would be ample opportunity to debate the matter in an elective fashion in the House of Commons. I hope that we would be able to move to the position where we could have a substantive vote at some point on the use of our armed forces unless of course there is an urgency about the situation. In which case it is open to the prime minister to deploy those forces in the national interest. I think that's unlikely; we seem to be getting into the swing of recalling Parliament so there should be no excuse for not having a full debate in the Commons and a substantive vote.

Quite honestly, from what I hear our troops would expect it. The word 'on the street' is that many members of our armed forces are a little uneasy at what's going on and would be strengthened by evidence that they had the full and unequivocal backing of the House of Commons.

Legally the prime minister can pretty well do what he likes but that's really not the point politically. And I think the onus is on him morally to have this matter fully debated in the Commons and submitted to a vote.

Question: Why now has Iraq suddenly topped the agenda?

Andrew Murrison: I think September 11 did change a great deal but we need to be clear about what can be pinned on international terrorism and what can be pinned on Iraq. The grey area between the two I have to say remains opaque following Colin Powell's revelations to the United Nations.

I share your dilemma. Why now? One thing is for sure we can't just have resolution after resolution after resolution because that becomes a proxy for doing nothing and my feeling is we cannot allow the UN to be flouted. That's something that's emerged more and more over the last few days. There's concern that we need to deal with Saddam but more than that we need to make sure that no one makes a monkey out of the UN.

I think that was what the prime minister was getting at a few weeks ago when he made a very impassioned statement at PMQs about this thing having the potential to haunt future generations. I think that's an important point.

We do pin all our hopes in the United Nations but if it's seen to be a weak and ineffectual body then you really do cry havoc and let loose the dogs of war. We cannot allow that to happen.

Question: You are on the reservists list. What are the odds of you being called up?

Andrew Murrison: Having left the Navy within the past five years I am legally open to be called up. I'm a doctor by trade and obviously the defence medical service is in a truly dreadful state at the moment. One concern I do have is our ability to put together the necessary medical support to sustain whatever action the government decides ultimately to take in the Middle East.

Being in a shortage category I'm in line to be called up like thousands of others across the country. That puts a slightly interesting angle on it for me.

Question: What happens if an MP is called up?

Andrew Murrison: Well it obviously puts me in a very difficult position. My job here is to represent my constituents and they would be concerned if I was absent for a protracted period of time. I think if I was able to help out in the recess for example then I would be very happy to do so. But it would be very difficult and a judgement would have to be made into the circumstances if such a recall were attempted whilst the House was sitting.

Question: There were very few Allied casualties in the last Gulf war do you think there will be more this time?

Andrew Murrison: I was serving in 1991 and I was pleasantly surprised that the casualty list was as short as it was. I remember thinking at the time 'my word we have got away lightly' when you bear in mind what could have happened. There were chemical agents available; we know that, whatever the case is now we know it was there then. It could have been deployed.

We cannot be certain that we would get off as lightly - if I can put it in such flippant terms - a second time.

Of course in 1991 we didn't have a mandate to do anything more than liberate Kuwait and that's what we did. I think if we were to press further towards Baghdad we're into urban warfare, not just desert warfare, with all the casualties both military and civilian that is likely to bring.

Also I think Saddam would find himself with his back up against the wall. And like any cornered individual he will fight like fury, I suspect, and use everything that he has. That potentially opens a whole Pandora's box and I am very worried.

You also need to bear in mind the numbers being deployed this time are truly huge so it follows that a larger action is expected than we had in 1991. That brings with it the potential for greater casualties.

People shouldn't look at 1991 and think 'oh well we came away with relatively few casualties' because we can't assume that's going to be the case again. My fear is that it will be a lot worse.

We've also got to bear in mind so-called collateral damage. We don't clearly know how many civilians lost their lives in 1991. We suspect strongly that a large number were killed following the liberation of Kuwait by Saddam's own hand and because of rebel action. I imagine we could expect substantial civilian collateral damage this time and that is also great worry.

Question: You've raised concerns about how the MoD has handled the issue of Gulf veterans. Do you think lessons have been learnt?

Andrew Murrison: I thought at the time that the MoD wasn't taking things seriously enough in comparison with the Americans. The States had the rather awful benefit of having gone through Vietnam. We didn't have that. So they had the experience of a large number of troops coming back with obscure medical complaints.

In mitigation I think that's why we were a little bit tardy in getting our medical assessment programme of the ground but nevertheless I think we need to put up our hands and say 'perhaps we didn't do things as well as we should have done' and learn the lessons.

My point in pressing the minister has been to get an assurance that we have learnt the lesson of troops coming back from a novel environment with multifarious agents in theatre.

We should be assessing people adequately; in other words a series of health checks following their deployment and also putting in place the necessary research programmes early on to detect whether people coming back from the Gulf this time were more likely than the general population to suffer from certain complaints.

I don't think we did it particularly well in the 1990s because this was very new to us and I want to make sure that this time around we don't have a similar state of confusion.

Question: Do you have a wider concern that the conflict we are facing is a potential Vietnam? Most recent conflicts have been 'liberation' actions such as the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Falklands.

Andrew Murrison: I think that's a little bit alarmist but we always have to bear in mind the liberations - it's a good way of putting it - which you allude to; the Falklands, highly successful, Kosovo highly successful despite the Russians declining to support the action taken which is a lesson in itself, 1991 was highly successful in its aims.

One would hope that any future conflict in that area, if unfortunately we had to have a conflict, would also be successful but of course once you start this kind of thing you can't just put it all back in the box. You are setting in train events over which you have some control but not complete. That's the worry and you have to factor that into your decision-making process before you commit the forces in the way the government is proposing